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There is a controlling Utah case 
included in an ALR annotation on point 4 
Appellees waived their objections to 
issuance of process by appearing in the 
first case on the merits without waiting 
until "after" a ruling on their objections 
as required under U.R.C.P. 12 (b). They 
claimed the date of wrongful death was 
August 22 instead of September 5, they 
challenged the constitutionality of the 
Utah savings statute, and then they cross-
appealed because the trial court dismissed 
without prejudiced and they wanted a dismissal 
with prejudice, all in a case where they claimed 
the court had no jurisdiction 8 
Hansen & Anderson's signing of summonses 
on October 19, 1988, and giving them to 
a court runner is sufficient to 
raise a factual issue as to whether 
summonses were issued on that date 12 
The "law of the case" contradicted itself. 
Appellees waited until after November 30, 1989, 
to point out that Mrs. Muir was required to 
file her second action under the Utah savings 
savings statute on or before that date. When it 
was disclosed that she had anticipated that deadline 
and had filed a second action on November 27, 1989, 
the court ruled that the second case could not be filed 
while the first case was still pending, but the court 
then dismissed her claims in the second case with 
prejudice, while dismissing another litigant's claims 
without prejudice even though an erroneous ruling in 
the case held those other claims to be time-barred 15 
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INTRODUCTION AND ADDITIONAL BASIS FOR REMAND 
As indicated by Apache Powder Company in its Brief, 
discovery in this case is continuing by stipulation of the 
parties. Douglas Bailey, who was injured in the same mine 
explosion that widowed Evelyn Muir, is still pursuing his 
case now pending in the Seventh District Court against the 
Appellees herein, and ongoing discovery is applicable to both 
his claims and Evelyn Muir's claims. 
Discovery applicable to the case reveals that it is 
the expert opinion of an explosives Nobel prize winner that 
the safety fuse manufactured and distributed by Appellees was 
defective and unreasonably dangerous. 
Evelyn Muir has yet to be given her day in court to 
present this expert testimony, and is seeking that 
opportunity through this consolidated appeal from the 
dismissals of the two wrongful death actions that she 
previously filed. 
Now Apache Powder Company has provided an additional 
basis for remand in its Brief. Apache Powder Company 
correctly points out in its Brief that Douglas Bailey's 
claims are still pending in the Seventh District Court, and 
that no final judgment as to all claims and all parties was 
ever entered. This means that Evelyn Muir's claims in her 
first case should be remanded to be tried together with 
Douglas Bailey's claims as part of the case now pending in 
the Seventh District Court. Apache Powder Company should not 
be heard to contradict itself by claiming that the first case 
was never commenced but is still pending in the trial Court. 
2 
W.H. Burt Explosives, Inc., attempts to take exactly 
the opposite position by claiming that a final judgment was 
entered below, but that it was not appealed from. However, 
this does not save W.H. Burt from the effects of the 
additional basis for remand in Apache Powder Company's Brief. 
Since it is Apache's position that the two (2) cases on 
appeal are connected with the third case now pending in the 
Seventh District Court to a degree that renders the orders in 
the first two (2) cases non-final, then the first case was 
commenced as to Apache Powder Company, it appealed and 
litigated on the merits as discussed in Point II below, and 
W.H. Burt was subject to having summons issued and served at 
any time prior to trial. This makes the summons served upon 
W. H. Burt in the first case valid even if it was issued 
immediately prior to being served. Furthermore, W. H. Burt 
joined in Apache's cross appeal going to the merits. 
SUMMARY OF REPLY 
1. The case of Askwith vs. Ellis is the controlling 
authority in this case. 
2. Apache Power Company concedes in its Brief that 
it appeared in the first case and litigated on the merits. 
3. The question of whether Summons was issued on 
October 19, 1988, is a question of fact. 
4. A remedy under the State Constitution is 
appropriate in this case and Evelyn Muir's claims are 
properly before this court on appeal even though no final 
3 
judgment was entered and Co-Plaintiff Douglas Bailey still 
has claims pending against Appellees in the District Court. 
REPLY 
POINT I 
TIMELY FILING OF THE COMPLAINT IN THE FIRST CASE 
COMMENCED THE ACTION WITHIN DUE TIME UNDER ASKWITH v. ELLIS. 
Neither appellee disagrees that under Askwith v. 
Ellis, 85 Utah 103, 38 P.2d 757 (1934), filing of a complaint 
alone within due time constitutes commencement within due 
time for purposes of a subsequent savings statute action. 
Nor do they disagree that the annotation at 27 A.L.R.2d 236, 
255, groups Utah with the states where filing of a complaint 
alone commences an action for savings statute purposes, even 
if no summons is timely issued or served. 
Apache Powder Company simply declines to address this 
Utah precedent and instead cites foreign cases that are of no 
precedential value, because the annotation at 27 A.L.R.2d 236 
reveals a split of authority caused in part by differences 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction in the language of the 
statutes and rules being applied. 
The other appellee, W. H. Burt Explosives, Inc., at 
least attempts to address the Askwith case, but tries to 
escape its effects by arguing that it was superseded by the 
adoption of the old U.R.C.P 4(b). However, the Askwith case 
itself holds that "it is the duty of the Legislature and not 
of the courts" to make law in which an action ceases to 
exist. No such law has been enacted through the legislative 
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process in Utah. W. H. Burt tries to treat court adoption of 
the old U.R.C.P. 4(b) as though it somehow amended U.C.A. 
Sec. 78-12-40 or somehow reversed the holding in Askwith v. 
Ellis. Even if the adoption of a rule of civil procedure 
could have such a broad legislative and judicial sweep, the 
language in the old rule 4(b) actually supports the position 
of Mrs. Muir and is contrary to the argument of appellees. 
Former U.R.C.P 4(b) states: 
(b) Time of issuance and service. If an action is 
commenced by the filing of a complaint, summons 
must issue thereon within three months from the 
date of such filing. The summons must be served 
within one year after the filing of the 
complaint or the action will be deemed 
dismissed, provided that in any action brought 
against two or more defendants in which personal 
service has been obtained upon one of them 
within the year, the other or others may be 
served or appear at any time before trial. 
The rule applies to instances where "an action is 
commenced by the filing of a complaint" and clearly 
recognizes that an action can be so commenced. The rule 
states that a summons must be issued within three months, but 
does not mandate any consequence for failure to so issue 
within three months. It also provides that the summons must 
be served within one year "or the action will be deemed 
dismissed" except for cases with more than one defendant 
where at least one defendant has been served. The choice of 
the words "deemed dismissed" means that an action is first 
commenced, then dismissed. The rule does not use words like 
"deemed never to have commenced" used in jurisdictions like 
North Carolina that find themselves on the other side of the 
split of authority on the matter. The argument Apache 
attempts to advance in its brief that "deemed dismissed" 
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means the same thing as "deemed never to have commenced" and 
that the rule somehow "suggests" that the action is dismissed 
ab initio when summons is not issued within three months is 
contrary to the language in the rule. 
In short, the words "deemed dismissed" mean something 
different than do the words "deemed never to have commenced" 
used in North Carolina. This was raised by Mrs. Muir in the 
trial court, and she even filed with the trial court a copy 
of the case of Everhart v. Sowers, 306 S.E.2d 472 (N.C.App. 
1983)(R2, pp.130-131). A case can't be deemed dismissed 
unless it is first commenced. It can't be deemed dismissed 
if it is deemed never to have commenced. The only consistent 
reading of the old U.R.C.P. 3 and 4 is that a case is 
"commenced" by the filing of a complaint or the service of a 
summons and then, if there is a subsequent failure in 
issuance, service, or filing, the case is then "deemed 
dismissed" as of the end of the deadline date for performing 
the subsequent act that was not performed. There is no good 
reason why the provisions of the Utah savings statute should 
not apply to such failures of actions not on the merits, just 
as they apply to other failures of actions not on the merits. 
Accordingly, Evelyn Muir commenced her first case by 
filing it on time, and she properly relied on U.C.A. 
78-12-40 in filing her second case, the dismissal of the 
first case having expressly been entered "without prejudice" 
even though appellees had sought one with prejudice. 
Appellees try to march out a parade of imaginary 
horribles in which litigants might file a complaint and 
"delay one year, five years, or ten years" before issuing and 
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serving summons. (Brief of W. H. Burt, p. 26) . The 
hypothetical does not fit, because there was no such delay 
here and summonses were served upon both defendants within 
one year of the filing of the complaint, which is the time 
for service stated in the old U.R.C.P. 4(b). If a court were 
faced with litigants who engaged in such a stratagem, the 
court could simply dismiss with prejudice for failure to 
prosecute. Appellees sought such dismissal below, but the 
court rejected those efforts, there being no failure to 
prosecute in this record, with Mrs. Muir having at least 
attempted issuance of summonses within three months and 
having served summonses and complaints within one year of the 
filing of her complaint. 
Accordingly, Askwith v. Ellis, supra, is the 
controlling authority on the issue of commencement within due 
time, and Mrs. Muir properly brought her second case under 
U.C.A. 78-12-40 even if summonses were not timely issued in 
the first case and even if appellees did not subject 
themselves to jurisdiction by litigating on the merits in the 
first case. 
The effect of U.C.A. 78-12-40 is enough to warrant 
reversal and remand of the second case. However, that issue 
does not even need to be reached, because there was appellee 
litigation on the merits in the first case, as set forth in 
the next reply point. 
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POINT II 
APACHE NOW CONCEDES THAT ITS DISCOVERY IN THE FIRST 
CASE INTO RECORDS KEPT BY THE UTAH STATE MEDICAL EXAMINER 
CONSTITUTED DISCOVERY INTO THE NONPROCEDURAL FACTUAL MERITS, 
THEREBY INVOKING THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT. 
Apache's Brief reveals for the first time why it 
served a subpoena duces tecum and noticed up the records 
deposition for the state medical examiner in the first case: 
"Apache did this to confirm the alleged 
date of Mr. Muir's death for purposes 
of calculating exactly when the statute 
of limitations had run." (Apache Brief, p. 18) 
This was discovery going to the factual merits of the 
case. The complaint in the first case was filed on September 
1, 1988 (Rl, p. 1). It alleged that the blast that caused 
Mr. Muir's death had occurred on or about September 5, 1986 
(Rl, p. 4). Accordingly, on its face the complaint in the 
first case was filed within the two-year period of the 
wrongful death statute of limitations and Apache now concedes 
that it was attempting to "confirm" the date of death alleged 
on the face of the complaint. 
Disputes over date-of-death are questions of fact. 
Such statute of limitations disputes are questions of fact 
for the jury, to be tried together with the other issues in 
the case. This is not a medical malpractice action where the 
statute of limitations issue is tried separately (See U.C.A. 
78-12-47). 
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Even in such a case, the issue would still be tried 
as a question of fact. The firm representing Apache 
certainly has a working knowledge of the foregoing, yet it 
chose to pursue discovery that it now concedes was done to 
"confirm" the date of death before first obtaining a ruling 
on its motion to dismiss, which contained only two procedural 
defenses (Rl, p.44), and did not raise any nonprocedural 
issues concerning date of death or statute of limitations. 
The state medical examiner's records concerning date 
of death have nothing to do with the two procedural defenses 
in the motion to dismiss. Such discovery concerning the date 
of death, together with the attempts to secure a dismissal of 
the first case with prejudice, including a since abandoned 
cross-appeal of the first case claiming that it should have 
been dismissed with prejudice after the trial court had 
already dismissed the case without prejudice, all constitute 
litigation of the merits of the case. 
As discussed in the Introduction above, even though 
the Stipulation that discovery in this case continue as part 
of Douglas Bailey's case now pending in the Seventh District 
Court includes the provision that "nothing herein or done 
pursuant hereto shall constitute a general appearance by any 
party in any proceeding or a waiver of any objection to venue 
or jurisdiction by any party in any proceeding" (Apache 
Brief, Addendum C, p. 2), Apache now argues that the first 
case (which was the subject of its own cross-appeal) is 
still pending before the Seventh District Court. This gives 
rise to further litigation activity going to the factual 
merits on the part of Apache. 
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Jurisdictional defenses are not waived merely for 
being joined with nonjurisdictional defenses under U.R.C.P 
12(b). However, Apache elected to raise only jurisdictional 
defenses by filing a motion to dismiss (Rl, p. 44), and then 
went well beyond the joining of defenses and actually 
litigated on the merits without first obtaining a ruling on 
its motion to dismiss. Under U.R.C.P. 12(b), any "further 
pleading" constitutes a waiver unless it takes place "after" 
denial of the motion or objection. Therefore, having used 
the power of the court to obtain the records of the state 
medical examiner on a statute of limitations question of fact 
not even raised in its motion to dismiss and before the 
motion was ruled upon, Apache waived its procedural defenses 
and can longer claim a lack of jurisdiction. 
Apache appears to have been trying to prove that Mr. 
Muir died on August 22, 1986, instead of on September 5, 
1986. Apache alleged that this was the date of death in one 
of its many memoranda filed in its attempt to get the first 
case dismissed with prejudice (Rl, p.215). If the records 
of the Utah State Medical Examiner had shown this to be the 
date of death, Apache might have been able to secure a 
dismissal with prejudice in the first case by showing that 
the September 1, 1988, filing date in the first case was 
beyond the two-year wrongful death statute of limitations. 
However, the attempt to show that the date of death 
was August 22, 1986, instead of September 5, 1986, was not a 
successful one for Apache, and, having litigated on the 
merits, it waived its two defenses concerning issuance and 
service of process. 
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Apache claims in its Brief that Mrs. Muir cited only 
the rules of baseball for this proposition. This is not the 
case. Mrs. Muir raised the issue of Apache's appearance on 
the merits to the trial court and cited several court cases 
in support of her position that Apache had thereby waived its 
two defenses concerning issuance and service of process (Rl. 
pp. 117-121, reproduced as addenda to this Reply Brief). 
Based on the cases cited to the trial court as shown 
in the addenda hereto, even the slightest act inconsistent 
with an objection to jurisdiction constitutes a waiver. 
Certainly, Apache's admission in its brief that it sought 
discovery of the date of Mr. Muir's death, when combined with 
all of Apache's other litigation activities on the merits 
that went so far as to even challenge the Utah savings 
statute as an unconstitutional and null attempt by the 
legislature to infringe upon judicial power (Rl, p. 182), is 
wholly inconsistent with its position that the court had no 
jurisdiction because summonses were not issued within three 
months and the out-of-state officer had not endorsed the 
summons properly. Having litigated the merits without 
waiting until "after" a ruling on its Motion to Dismiss as 
required under U.R.C.P. 12(b), Apache waived its objections 
to issuance and service of process. 
With Apache in the case, W. H. Burt is and was 
subject to having summons issued and served upon it at any 
time prior to trial. Valley Asphalt, Inc. v. Eldon J. Stubbs 
Construction. 714 P.2d 114 (Utah 1986). 
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POINT III 
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO RULE THAT NO SUMMONS 
WAS ISSUED ON OCTOBER 19, 1988, WITHOUT HOLDING AN 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON THE MATTER. 
There is at least a disputed issue of fact over 
whether no summons was issued on October 19, 1988. 
Mrs. Muir contends that two summonses were signed by 
a lawyer at the firm of Hansen & Anderson on October 19, 
1988, that on the same day the lawyer placed them in the 
hands of a person qualified to serve process for the purpose 
of service of process, that immediately thereafter the lawyer 
told the process server to hold-off on service of process 
until further instructions were given, and that upon 
further instructions summonses were timely served. 
Appellees contend that two summonses were signed by a 
lawyer at the firm of Hansen & Anderson on October 19, 1988, 
and that on the same day the lawyer placed them in the hands 
of a person qualified to serve process for the purpose of 
storage and not for the purpose of service of process. 
It is Mrs. Muir's position that the affidavits filed 
with the Returns of Service (Rl, pp. 20 and 36), the 
deposition of Steven F. Jackson, and the Affidavit of William 
P. Schwartz (Rl, p. 157), establish the undisputed fact that 
summonses were placed in Mr. Jackson's hands for the purpose 
of service of process on October 19, 1988, that immediately 
thereafter he was told to hold-off on service until further 
instructions were given, and after further instructions both 
12 
summonses were served within the required one-year period 
after the filing of the complaint in the first case. 
At a minimum, a genuine factual dispute is 
established by the foregoing precluding granting of a motion 
to dismiss. 
Appellees contend that Mrs. Muir was supposed to 
request an evidentiary hearing, and did not do so, thereby 
waiving it and failing to preserve the issue. 
However, Mrs. Muir opposed the motions to dismiss her 
complaint. Any time a plaintiff opposes a motion to dismiss, 
the plaintiff is asking the court to deny the motion so that 
the matter can go forward at the trial court level to an 
eventual trial of the facts. There is no requirement in the 
rules that a plaintiff request a trial setting or other 
evidentiary hearing at the time the plaintiff opposes a 
motion to dismiss, for such an eventual trial of the facts is 
the inherent purpose for opposing a motion to dismiss. 
It was error for the trial court to rule that no 
summons was issued on October 19, 1988, based on this record. 
Steven F. Jackson was a person qualified to serve the 
summonses under the statutes and rules in effect at the time 
and the summonses were given to him with the express purpose 
of service of process and complying with the requirement that 
a summons be issued within three months of the filing of a 
complaint. At a minimum, the motion to dismiss should have 
been denied without prejudice to a future hearing in which 
both sides could present evidence. 
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The disputed factual nature of this point renders the 
"correctness" standard of appellate review urged by Appellees 
incomplete. This case is not limited to interpretation of 
statutes and rules, but also involves the factual question of 
whether Hansen & Anderson issued summonses on October 19, 
1988. 
It was error for the court to base its ruling on 
"undisputed facts" because those facts were never listed as 
such in the memoranda supporting the motions to dismiss as 
provided under C.J.A. 4-501. 
Further, U.R.C.P. 12 provides for treating a U.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6) motion as one for summary judgment under U.R.C.P. 
56, but makes no such provision for treating the kind of 
jurisdictional motions brought by defendants as ones for 
summary judgment. At a minimum, there should have been some 
reasonable notice that the court intended to do so with a 
reasonable opportunity to place facts in dispute, just as 
there must be under U.R.C.P. 12(b) when a motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim is treated as one for summary 
j udgment. 
As things stand, the facts concerning issuance of 
summonses on October 19, 1988, remain very much in dispute, 
the proper standard of review is review of the record and all 
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the record in the 
light most favorable to Mrs. Muir, who opposed dismissal, and 
the matter must be remanded to the trial court. 
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POINT IV 
A REMEDY UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTION IS APPROPRIATE 
IN THIS CASE AND EVELYN MUIR'S CLAIMS ARE PROPERLY BEFORE 
THIS COURT EVEN THOUGH NO FINAL JUDGMENT HAS BEEN ENTERED. 
Evelyn Muir and Douglas Bailey filed the first case 
on September 1, 1988 (Rl, p. 1). Appellees filed motions to 
dismiss and argued that there had already been an "automatic" 
dismissal three months after the case was filed (Rl, p. 48). 
Due to the likelihood that appellees would argue that the 
one-year period under the Utah Savings Statute at U.C.A. Sec. 
78-12-4 0 had automatically started running on November 30, 
1988, Evelyn Muir and Douglas Bailey filed a second lawsuit 
on November 27, 1989 (R2, p. 1) as a precaution in order to 
commence the second action within one-year of November 30, 
1988, in case of an adverse ruling in the first case. After 
the trial court entered its ruling on January 5, 1990, 
granting dismissals of the first case without prejudice (Rl, 
p. 203), Evelyn Muir and Douglas Bailey amended their 
complaint in the second case once as a matter of course prior 
to the service of a responsive pleading pursuant to U.R.C.P. 
15(a) to affirmatively state that it was brought under the 
Utah Savings Statute at U.C.A. Sec. 78-12-40. They caused 
summonses to be issued and served within three (3) months of 
November 27, 1989 (R2, pp. 15-31, and 61-62). 
The second case was dismissed with prejudice as to 
Mrs. Muir and without prejudice as to Mr. Bailey. Douglas 
Bailey then filed a third case. It was filed in the Third 
District Court, because W. H. Burt had filed an Answer in the 
second case denying that venue was proper in the Seventh 
15 
District Court and denying that it was a resident of Moab, 
Utah (R2, p. 66), which would mean that Mr. Bailey could sue 
these two out-of-state defendants in the Third District Court 
under U.C.A. 78-13-7. 
In the third case, W. H. Burt changed its position 
and asserted that venue was proper in the Seventh District 
Court, whereupon the case was transferred to the Seventh 
District Court in and for Grand County, State of Utah, in 
Moab, Utah. While the case was still pending in the Third 
District Court, all parties entered into a Stipulation that 
discovery in the third case would apply to the first two 
cases in the event of a remand. Based on the foregoing, 
Apache correctly asserts that there has been no final order 
as to all claims and all parties, because Mr. Bailey's claims 
are still pending in the Seventh District Court. However, a 
review of the record, the positions taken by the parties, and 
the rulings below, reveals that Mrs. Muir properly appealed 
from the rulings below and is justified in looking to the 
Constitution of Utah for relief. 
It is, of course, Mrs. Muirfs hope that the state 
constitutional questions will not be reached in this case, 
with reversal and remand being granted based on the non-
constitutional grounds already raised. 
Mrs. Muir challenges the rulings below and the 
underlying statutes as having the cumulative effect of 
denying her due process of law guaranteed to her under 
Article I, §7, of the Constitution of Utah, and denying her 
access to open courts and remedy by due course of law 
16 
administered without denial or unnecessary delay guaranteed 
to her under Article I, §11, of the Constitution of Utah. 
The bedrock legal doctrines set out in these 
provisions are normally carried out by application of rules 
of procedure. 
"Our rules of procedure are intended to 
encourage the adjudication of disputes 
on their merits." 
Bonneville Tower Condominium Management Comm. v. Thompson 
Michie Assocs., 728 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1986). However, when the 
cumulative "law of the case" holds that an action under the 
savings statute could not be filed until after January 5, 
1990, but also had to be filed before November 30, 1989, then 
this Court should look to the state constitution itself and 
apply its principles to the case before it. 
Apache claims that Mrs. Muir never raised these state 
constitutional issues at the trial level. (Apache Brief, 
Page 39). Contrary to this assertion by Apache, state 
constitutional issues were raised in a Motion and Memorandum 
for Relief from Order: 
"This Motion is made on the grounds that the 
Order is based on an error in law and denies 
these Plaintiffs due process and equal 
protection under the state and federal 
constitutions as well as denying them open 
access to the courts and remedy in due course of 
law guaranteed to them under Article I, § 11 of 
the Constitution of Utah." (R2, P.168) 
Not only was the issue raised, but a request for 
hearing on the matter was also filed. (R2, P.173). 
Therefore, the claim by Apache that "Plaintiff never asked 
for a hearing at the trial court," (Apache Brief, P.38) is 
17 
also incorrect. Indeed, the failure of the trial court to 
grant any kind of hearing whatsoever was also contradictory 
to Apache's own request for oral argument (Rl, P.253) which 
was never granted or otherwise acted upon by the Court. This 
request for oral argument by Apache was yet another example 
of litigation on the merits in the first case by Apache. The 
request was made by Apache in its ongoing efforts to seek 
dismissal with prejudice long after the court had already 
ruled that it was dismissing the first case without prejudice 
on procedural grounds. 
Mrs. Muir filed the Motion and Memorandum for Relief 
from Order seeking constitutional remedy from the trial court 
due to the manner in which the trial court was moving back 
and forth between the first two cases in entering its rulings 
in the first two cases. 
As explained above, Mrs. Muir filed her second 
lawsuit on November 27, 1989, in anticipation of the argument 
by Apache that the one (1) year period under the saving 
statute commenced on November 30, 1988, upon "automatic" 
dismissal of the first case three months after it was filed. 
Apache made this very argument on January 19, 1990: 
"The only other possible alternative 
interpretation of when the action was 'deemed 
dismissed1 is three months after filing when the 
time for issuing the complaint ran. But, that 
date was November 30, 1989, more that 14 months 
ago. In either case, plaintiffs' one year 
savings period has expired." (Rl, P.218) 
Mrs. Muir countered this argument by pointing out to 
the Court that the second case had been filed on November 27, 
1989, for the very purpose of bringing it within that one (1) 
year period. (Rl, P.239) 
18 
Even though the trial court had been informed about 
this second lawsuit and the reason for its filing, when the 
Court later ruled that the action would be dismissed without 
prejudice, the Court included the following sentence: 
"Any ruling on the running of the Statute of 
Limitations as it applies to plaintiff's Cause 
of Action would have to be made if and when the 
plaintiff refiles the action seeking the same 
relief." (Rl, P.256) 
Evelyn Muir was left with no choice but to appeal the 
dismissal of the first case, even though it was entered 
without prejudice. There was no need for Douglas Bailey to 
appeal, because the four (4) year Statute of Limitations on 
his personal injury claims had not yet run and there would be 
no Statute of Limitations issue in his claims. Therefore, 
the "if and when the Plaintiff refiles the action" language 
in the ruling was very confusing in light of the fact that 
another action had already been filed. 
The confusion continued in the ruling in the second 
case (R2, P.132; reproduced as Addenda A-5 through A-8, W.H. 
Burt Brief). The trial court wrote that the second case had 
been filed on November 27, 1989, even though the first case 
had not been dismissed until January 5, 1990. "Based upon 
this fact alone, this case should be dismissed as to all 
Plaintiffs except Virginia Lowe. Procedurally you cannot 
maintain two actions involving the same parties and the same 
cause of action at one time," the Court wrote. (R2, P.13 3; 
Addendum A-6, W.H. Burt Brief). 
When this ruling is viewed in light of the record in 
both cases, an impossible situation for Mrs. Muir was 
19 
created. Based upon the record in the first case, she had to 
bring her second action prior to November 30, 1989, in order 
to bring it within one (1) year of the expiration of the 
three (3) month period for issuance of summons in the first 
case. Yet, in the second case, the Court now ruled that her 
second Complaint, filed on November 27, 1989, should be 
dismissed because it was filed before the first case was 
dismissed on January 5, 1990. 
Mrs. Muir did all she could have been expected to do 
under the circumstances. She filed her second case on 
November 27, 1989, and waited for the Court to rule in the 
first case. After the first case was ruled dismissed on 
January 5, 1990, she filed her Amended Complaint in the 
second case on January 29, 1990, now that she could "allege 
that this is an action partially covered by the provisions of 
U.C.A. §78-12-40 commenced within one (1) year after a 
failure by Plaintiffs otherwise than upon the merits in an 
action commenced within due time on September 1, 1988, in 
this Court under Civil No. 5719," (R2, p.15). 
State constitutional due process and access to the 
Courts provisions are offended when the one (1) year 
provision under the saving statute starts running three (3) 
months after a case is filed but filing of a second case 
within that one (1) year period is not allowed because the 
first case has not yet been dismissed. 
The confusion in the rulings becomes even more 
pronounced after Mrs. Muir raised the constitutional issues 
before the trial court and asked the Court for relief from 
its Order. The Court wrote that Mrs. Muir's request for 
20 
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P.177). This means that even if the duplicate Order had 
dismissed anything that had not already been dismissed on 
April 2, 1990, it was signed by the Court only two (2) days 
after the three (3) day mailing period expired, and was 
therefore prematurely signed in error. 
Accordingly, the Court should reject the argument by 
W. H. Burt that it somehow is not before the Court in the 
appeal of the second case. 
Based upon all of the foregoing, Mrs. Muir's claims 
were properly appealed in both cases and should be remanded 
to the trial court for proceedings on the merits based upon 
state constitutional guarantees if they are not remanded on 
the other grounds included in this consolidated appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The orders of dismissal should be reversed and the 
matter should be remanded to the trial court for further 
proceedings on all of Evelyn Muir's claims. 
z^ DATED this U day of February, 1991. 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
EVELYN MUIR, LINDA MUIR, \ 
DEANNA PFEIFFER, SANDRA ] 
JENKINS, MARK MUIR, MARLO ] 
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PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO APACHE 
I POWDER COMPANY'S RESPONSE 
TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
1 PROTECTIVE ORDER 
I Civil No. 5719 
On September 27, 1989, Apache Powder Company served its 
Response to Plaintiffs1 Motion for Protective Order. This is 
Plaintiffs1 Reply to that Response, which is filed pursuant to 
Rule 4-501(3) of the Rules of Judicial Administration. 
POINT I. 
APACHE HAS SUBMITTED ITSELF TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE 
COURT THROUGH ITS CONDUCT AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTS. 
In its response to Plaintiffs1 Motion for Protective 
Order, Apache argues that it has not waived any defense because 
the distinction between general and special appearances has 
been abolished for purposes of Rule 12. However, Utah case law 
makes it clear that Rule 12 merely abolishes the "distinction" 
between voluntary general and special appearances for Rule 12 
purposes only. A general appearance through conduct and acts 
still creates a waiver of objections to jurisdiction and 
process and still constitutes submission to the jurisdiction of 
the court. 
Apache has submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the 
Court and waived its objections concerning jurisdiction and 
process through its conduct and acts in securing from the court 
a Subpoena to take the records deposition of the Utah State 
Medical Examiner after moving for dismissal "on the merits" and 
seeking a continuance. 
A recent Utah case shows that even the slightest act by 
a party that is inconsistent with his objections to 
jurisdiction will constitute a waiver. In Maxwell vs. Maxwell, 
754 P.2d 84 (Utah App. 1988), the court held that the "special 
appearance" was ineffective and a "general appearance" had been 
made merely because the party asked for affirmative relief by 
opposing a motion for sanctions and moving for a continuance. 
This rule applies in ceses where there has been no 
effective service of process. In the recent case of Nunley vs. 
Nunley, 757 P.2d 473 (Utah App. 1988), the court held that 
where there is no effective service of process, a party may 
challenge a court's jurisdiction without submitting himself to 
it, but if the party asks the court for affirmative relief, 
that party is subject to the court's jurisdiction. This rule 
of Utah law that does not allow a party to act inconsistently 
with his position that the court has no jurisdiction without 
waiving his objections to jurisdiction has also been adopted by 
the federal courts. The state and federal cases cited by 
Apache are factually distinguishable from this case. 
In the leading federal case relied upon by Apache, 
Orange Theatre Corp vs. Rayherstz Amusement Corp, 139 F.2d 871 
(3rd Cir 1944) , the court held that the defense of lack of 
jurisdiction over the person was waived by a Defendant if "he 
has waived it by some action other than his voluntary 
appearance". 
A recent case that provides a summary of federal law in 
the area is U.S., Combustion Systems vs. Eastern Metal 
Products, 112 F.R.D. 685 (M.D.N.C. 1986). In that case the 
Court held: 
Personal defenses, such as lack of 
jurisdiction, may be be deemed waived for 
failure to timely raise the defense, by 
formally submitting oneself to the 
jurisdiction of the Court, 'or by 
"submission through conduct." (Citation 
omitted) Waiver has been inferred in a wide 
variety of situations, even when the 
defense has been formally raised in an 
answer, by conduct and inaction, such as 
entering an appearance, filing motions and 
requesting relief, or participating in 
hearings or discovery. (Citations omitted) 
(Emphasis added) 
In Union Camp Corporation vs. Dyal, 460 F.2d 678 (5th 
Cir 1972) , the court found conduct inconsistent with objections 
to personal jurisdiction and service: 
These appearances constituted a waiver of 
the right to object to the court's 
jurisdiction in personam, and appear to 
render moot the argument, much labored by 
counsel, concerning the validity of service 
of process. (Emphasis added) 
In this case, Apache clearly engaged in conduct and 
acts submitting itself to the jurisdiction of the court when it 
secured from the court a Subpoena to take the records 
deposition of the Utah State Medical Examiner after moving for 
dismissal "on the merits" and seeking a continuance. Such 
discovery had nothing to do with the issuance or service of the 
Apache Summons and went directly to the merits of the wrongful 
Apache has submitted itself to the personal jurisdiction of the 
court and has waived its objections concerning the alleged 
defects in issuance and service of process by engaging in 
affirmative acts inconsistent with those objections. 
In light of the foregoing, there is no reason for the 
deposition of Mr. Jackson to proceed and the Court should issue 
its protective order that said discovery not be had. 
POINT II. 
RULE 4(j) WAS COMPLIED WITH AND, IN ANY EVENT, A NEW 
SUMMONS COULD BE ISSUED AND SERVED UPON APACHE AT ANY TIME 
PRIOR TO THE TRIAL. 
The record shows that the Hunterdon County Sheriff was 
expressly instructed concerning Rule 4(j) and that he complied 
with the rule. Furthermore, a deposition of Steven F. Jackson 
would not be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
any admissible evidence concerning Rule 4(j). 
In its Reply Memorandum, Apache states that an action 
must be dismissed if a party fails to comply with Rule 4(j). 
However, the two cases cited by Apache did not involve a 
dismissal at all, but merely an appearance by a defendant made 
"timely and specially to quash the service" of process. That 
distinction is important in a multi-defendant case. 
In the case of Valley Asphalt, Inc. vs. Eldon J. Stubbs 
Construction, Inc., 714 P.2d 1114 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme 
Court construed Rule 4, U.R.C.P., to mean that Summonses as to 
multi-party defendants could be served any time prior to trial 
and did not have to be issued within three (3) months of the 
filing of the Complaint as long as timely issuance and service 
are met as to one (1) defendant. The 
court wrote that interpreting the rule otherwise would lead to 
a "harsh result" expressly eschewed by the court. 
POINT III. 
THERE IS NO DISPUTED ISSUE OF FACT CONCERNING MR. 
JACKSON'S CIVILIAN STATUS AND, THEREFORE, A DEPOSITION OF MR. 
JACKSON ON THAT POINT IS UNNECESSARY. 
It is not disputed that Mr. Jackson is neither sheriff, 
sheriff's deputy, United States marshall or marshall's deputy. 
Therefore, his deposition need not be taken on that point. 
However, Mr. Jackson's civilian status does not vitiate his 
status as a person qualified to serve a Summons upon an Apache 
agent within Utah under Rule 4 and to serve a Summons upon an 
Apache agent outside of the state under U.C.A. §78-27-25. 
Apache raises the novel argument that the legislature 
"had no power" to enact U.C.A. §78-27-25. Plaintiffs, of 
course, take the position that U.C.A. §78-27-25 is of full 
force and effect and was of full force and effect when the 
Apache Summons was issued to Mr. Jackson. However, legal 
argument on that point is beyond the scope of Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Protective Order, and the court should enter its 
order that the deposition of Steven F. Jackson not be taken 
because there is no dispute as to his status as a twenty-one 
year old civilian, not a party to the action. 
3 DATED this w? day of October, 1989, 
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